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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Joan Michelle Anderson appeals by permission from the district court's 
order denying her motion to dismiss. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The marriage between Anderson and her husband Ricky J. Anderson 
(hereinafter "Ricky") ended in divorce. (Exhibits, p. 2.1) The Montana court 
issuing the divorce found that both parents were "fit and proper" persons to have 
their child, P.A., and that both enjoyed a "close relationship and bond" with the 
child. (Exhibits, p. 2.) The court found allegations by Anderson that Ricky was 
abusive to P.A. to be "unsubstantiated" and declared itself "highly suspicious of 
manipulation" by Anderson. (Exhibits, pp. 2-3.) 
As part of the divorce the Montana court implemented a parenting plan as 
in the best interests of the child. (Exhibits, p. 4.) The parenting plan assigned 
rights equally to each parent in areas such as access to the child's records, 
consultation with health and school officials, and to be notified of any emergency. 
(Exhibits, p. 11.) The plan also set a residential schedule with P.A. residing 
"primarily" with Anderson but living with Ricky one week every month. (Exhibits, 
p. 11.) It established hours for telephone contact and a schedule for holidays. 
(Exhibits, pp. 12-14.) Ricky was required to maintain health insurance for P.A. 
1 Exhibits are included in the record in an electronic format, with the file name 
"exhibits. pdf." For ease of reference, cited page numbers are to the pages of the 
electronic file. 
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(Exhibits, pp. 14-15.) Each parent was granted "equal and independent 
authority" regarding decisions about school, health care and emergencies. 
(Exhibits, p. 15.) The parents were assigned alternating years for claiming the 
child as a dependant for tax purposes. (Exhibits, p. 16.) Anderson was 
designated the custodian of P.A. "solely for the purposes of all other State and 
Federal statutes that require a registration or determination of custody but the 
designation may not affect either parent's rights and responsibilities under the 
parenting plan." (Exhibits, p. 16.) 
About two weeks after the divorce decree was entered Anderson, who 
was living in Idaho, took P.A. to California rather than deliver him to Ricky as 
required by the parenting plan. (R., pp. 23-24, 304-06.) After a preliminary 
hearing a magistrate bound Anderson over on one count of kidnapping. (R., pp. 
23-24.) Thereafter the state charged Anderson by information with one count of 
kidnapping for keeping P.A. away from Ricky for approximately three months. 
(R., pp. 25-26.) 
Anderson moved to dismiss the information "on the basis that the 
kidnapping charge cannot be pursued under Idaho law as the mother is the 
custodial parent of the minor child." (R., p. 296.) The district court denied the 
motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 308-09, 314-21.) This Court granted permission to 
appeal the interlocutory order denying the motion to dismiss. (Order Granting 
Motion for permissive Appeal (August 11, 2011 ).) Anderson filed a timely appeal. 
(R., pp. 345-47.) 
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ISSUES 
In its August 11, 2011 Order Granting Motion for Permissive Appeal this 
Court defined the issue as: "[W]hether a parent with visitation rights is a 
custodial parent under I.C. § 18-4501." 
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ARGUMENT 
Ricky Was A Custodial Parent For Purposes Of The Kidnapping Statute 
A. Introduction 
The district court held that Ricky did have custodial rights in P.A. and that 
Anderson therefore had taken P.A. from a custodial parent. (R., pp. 314-15.) On 
appeal Anderson argues the district court erred, first contending that taking a 
child from the parent with the lesser custody rights is not kidnapping. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 14-18.) This argument is without merit. Ricky had superior 
custody rights to all other persons at the time Anderson took P.A. to California. 
Anderson next argues that the legislature intended that her crime be child 
custody interference to the exclusion of kidnapping. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-
25.) Although Anderson's crime certainly fits within the definition of child custody 
interference, Anderson has failed to show legislative intent that a parent be 
necessarily excluded from the kidnapping statute under circumstances present in 
this case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The granting or denial of a motion to dismiss an information is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hammersley, 134 Idaho 816, 817, 10 P.3d 
1285, 1286 (2000); State v. Keetch, 134 Idaho 327,329-30, 1 P.3d 828, 830-31 
(Ct. App. 2000). The interpretation and construction of a statute present 
questions of law over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. 
Thompson, 140 Idaho 796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); State v. Dorn, 140 
Idaho 404,405,94 P.3d 709,710 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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C. Taking A Child From A Parent With Custodial Rights In The Form Of 
Visitation Is Kidnapping 
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative 
intent. State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. 
Bateman-Hall, Inc., 139 Idaho 207,210,76 P.3d 951,954 (2003). Because "the 
best guide to legislative intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a 
statute must begin with the literal words of the statute. State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 
326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732 (2009). Where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, a court does not construe it but simply follows the law as written. 
McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 
(2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable 
interpretation, it is the court's duty to give the statute that interpretation. Verska 
v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, _ Idaho _, _ P.3d _,2011 
WL 5375192, at *6 (Idaho, Nov. 9, 2011) (not yet released for publication) 
(disavowing cases with language that Court might not give effect to unambiguous 
meaning of statute if such was "palpably absurd"). 
When the language of the statute is capable of more than one reasonable 
construction, however, it is ambiguous. Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Oist. 
No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655, 658 (2006). Consistent with the 
primary objective of statutory interpretation, an ambiguous statute (one capable 
of more than one reasonable construction) must be construed to mean what the 
legislature intended it to mean. 19.:. To ascertain legislative intent, the court must 
examine not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of 
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the proposed interpretations, the policy behind the statute, and its legislative 
history. Id. Further, fundamental principles of statutory interpretation and 
construction require the Court to construe statutes so that effect is given to every 
word, clause and sentence of the statute, Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 365, 
128 P.3d 897, 902 (2005), and to construe statutes relating to the same subject 
matter together to further legislative intent, State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382, 
987 P.2d 290,294 (1999). 
The plain language of the kidnapping statute includes Anderson's conduct. 
"Every person who wilfully: ... Leads, takes, entices away or detains a child 
under the age of sixteen (16) years, with intent to keep or conceal it from its 
custodial parent, guardian or other person having lawful care or control thereof ... 
is guilty of kidnaping." I.C. § 18-4501 (2) (spelling original). Under the facts of 
this case there is no doubt that Ricky was a "custodial parent, guardian or other 
person having lawful care or control" of P.A. at the time Anderson took P.A. to 
California and kept him from his father for months. 
Anderson argues Ricky was not a "custodial parent." Idaho has defined 
"custodial parent" for purposes of the Idaho Safe Haven Act as "the parent with 
whom the child resides" absent some court decree stating otherwise. I.C. § 39-
8202. Under Idaho law "joint custody" results from "an order awarding custody of 
the minor child or children to both parents and providing that physical custody 
shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child or children of 
frequent and continuing contact with both parents." I.C. § 32-717B(1). "Joint 
physical custody" results from "an order awarding each of the parents significant 
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periods of time in which a child resides with or is under the care and supervision 
of each of the parents," I.C. § 32-7178(2), while "joint lega/ custody" results from 
a "judicial determination that the parents or parties are required to share the 
decision-making rights, responsibilities and authority relating to the health, 
education and general welfare of a child," I.C. § 32-7178(3). 
Review of the Montana divorce decree shows unmistakably that Anderson 
and Ricky had joint custody of P.A. The parenting plan incorporated into the 
decree established a "residential schedule" under which P.A. would "reside 
primarily with" Anderson but that Ricky would "have parenting time one week per 
month" until P.A. started school, at which time the "parenting time" would be "two 
weekends per month" during school with summers divided equally. (Exhibits, p. 
11.) 8y setting up residency on a three-quarters time with mom and one-quarter 
time with dad, the divorce decree established joint physical custody as defined by 
Idaho law. I.C. § 32-7178(2). The parenting plan also granted "equal and 
independent authority" regarding decisions about school, health care and 
emergencies. (Exhibits, p. 15.) The decree thus established joint legal custody 
as well. I.C. § 32-7178(3). 
Anderson places much emphasis on her designation as custodian 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-14), but she was declared custodian "solely for the 
purposes of all other State and Federal statutes that require a registration or 
determination of custody but the designation may not affect either parent's rights 
and responsibilities under the parenting plan." (Exhibits, p. 16.) Her status as 
custodian was therefore joint except as required by registration or other 
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circumstances where only one parent could be designated as the custodian. 
Such did not give Anderson the right to deprive Ricky of physical or legal custody 
of P.A. as granted in the divorce decree. At all times relevant to this case Ricky 
had joint physical and legal custody of P.A. At the time Anderson took P.A. to 
California and each week P.A. would have been residing in Ricky's home under 
the decree, Ricky had physical custody rights to P.A. superior to Anderson's, and 
at all times they both enjoyed joint legal custody. Under the facts of this case, 
Ricky was a custodial parent. 
Anderson argues the word "custodial" is ambiguous because it could 
mean "legal custody, physical custody, joint custody, sole custody, temporary 
custody, or permanent custody." (Appellant's brief, p. 17 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).) She then invokes the rule of lenity and notice requirements of 
due process to generally claim that therefore the statute does not apply to her. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) This argument is without merit. 
First, the statute is not ambiguous. That there are many types of custody 
does not make the term "custodial parent" ambiguous. Indeed, a custodial 
parent is one with any of the custody rights listed by Anderson. In fact, Ricky 
was vested with them all on the weeks P.A. was living under his roof. Even 
though he did not possess exclusive custody rights at a/l times, such does not 
render the word "custodial" ambiguous. 
Second, the rule of lenity does not apply. The rule of lenity applies only if 
a criminal statute still remains ambiguous after applying all other rules of 
statutory construction. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641,646,22 P.3d 116, 121 
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(2001); State v. Rhode, 133 Idaho 459, 462, 988 P.2d 685, 688 (1999). "[T]he 
rule of lenity only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and purpose, 
there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the 
Court must simply guess as to what [the legislature] intended." Barber v. 
Thomas, _ U.S. _, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-09 (2010) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). Thus, the mere "grammatical possibility of a defendant's 
interpretation does not command a resort to the rule of lenity if the interpretation 
proffered by the defendant reflects an implausible reading of the [legislative] 
purpose." Abbott v. U.S., _ U.S. _, 131 S.Ct. 18, 31 n.9 (2010) (internal 
quotations omitted). Anderson's whole argument for ambiguity is that there are 
several different types of custody. There is no reason to believe the legislature 
did not include them all. She has failed to make a credible argument for 
ambiguity and application of the rule of lenity. 
Third, there are no due process problems with the statute. The void-for-
vagueness doctrine rests upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and requires that a penal statute define a criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982); State 
v. Korsen, 138 Idaho 706, 711, 69 P.3d 126, 131 (2003). A statute is void for 
vagueness if it (1) "fails to give adequate notice to people of ordinary intelligence 
concerning the conduct it proscribes," or (2) "fails to establish minimal guidelines 
to govern law enforcement or others who must enforce the statute." Korsen, 138 
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Idaho at 712, 69 P.3d at 132 (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 
(1983); Schwartzmiller v. Gardner, 752 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1984); State v. 
Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756, 24 P.3d 702, 704 (2001)). There is simply nothing 
constitutionally vague about the word "custodial." 
Finally, Anderson's argument proves too much. If Anderson were right, 
and Ricky were not a custodial parent, then it would not be kidnapping for a third 
person other than Anderson to lure P.A. away from Ricky with intent to conceal 
him from Ricky. If Ricky is a custodial parent for purposes of a stranger 
kidnapping, then the plain language of the statute also makes Anderson's actions 
kidnapping because she "[took] ... a child ... with intent to keep ... [him] from [his] 
custodial parent." I.C. § 18-4501 (2). Interpreting the statute as advocated by 
Anderson is both contrary to the plain language of the statute and would 
effectively mean that Idaho's kidnapping statute does not generally apply 
whenever a child is taken from a parent with mere "visitation" rights. 
In addition, during the periods of mandated visitation Ricky had superior 
rights of custody to even Anderson under the divorce decree. Anderson 
therefore took P.A. "with intent to ... conceal [him] from ... [a] person having 
lawful care or control thereof." I.C. § 18-4501 (2). State v. Chapman, 108 Idaho 
841, 843, 702 P.2d 879, 881 (Ct. App. 1985) ("the mere fact that the custodial 
right was temporary does not bar the charge of kidnapping against anyone, 
including the other parent") (Bakes, C.J. of the Idaho Supreme Court, with 
McFadden, J. of the Idaho Supreme Court sitting in special panel). 
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Under the plain language of the statute a person commits kidnapping 
when she takes a child with intent to conceal that child from a person with 
superior legal rights of custody. The evidence in this case shows that Anderson 
did just that when she took P.A. to California rather than allow P.A.'s father to 
exercise his custody rights as granted by the divorce decree. 
D. That Anderson's Conduct Was Also Child Custody Interference Did Not 
Prevent Her From Being Charged With Kidnapping 
The issue this Court granted permission to appeal was "whether a parent 
with visitation rights is a custodial parent under I.C. § 18-4501." (Order Granting 
Motion for permissive Appeal (August 11, 2011).) As shown above, Ricky was a 
custodial parent for purposes of the kidnapping statute. In her brief Anderson 
also argues that she should have been charged with child custody interference, 
not kidnapping, and therefore the prosecutor abused his charging discretion. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-25.) This Court did not grant permission to appeal any 
challenge to the state's charging discretion. This issue is therefore not properly 
before this Court. 
Even if this question were properly before this Court, no abuse of 
discretion has been shown. "Where the facts legitimately invoke more than one 
statute, a prosecutor is vested with a wide range of discretion in deciding what 
crime to prosecute." LaBarge v. State, 116 Idaho 936, 939, 782 P.2d 59, 63 (Ct. 
App. 1989) (prosecutor did not abuse discretion by charging lewd conduct where 
facts also supported a charge of incest). See also State v. Folsom, 139 Idaho 
627, 630-31, 84 P.3d 563, 566-67 (Ct. App. 2003) (prosecutor did not abuse 
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discretion by charging felony abandonment of vulnerable adult instead of 
misdemeanor neglect of an adult); State v. Hernandez, 136 Idaho 8, 12,27 P.3d 
417, 421 (Ct. App. 2001) (prosecutor did not abuse discretion by charging, under 
overlapping conspiracy statutes, conspiracy that that did not impose mandatory 
minimum for trafficking, and state was therefore bound by that choice); State v. 
Payan, 132 Idaho 614, 616-17, 977 P.2d 228, 230-31 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(prosecutor did not abuse discretion by charging trafficking instead of possession 
with intent to deliver). Mere statutory overlap does not remove the charging 
decision from prosecutorial discretion. Folsom, 139 Idaho at 630-31, 84 P.3d at 
566-67. Only where application of rules of statutory interpretation shows that the 
legislature intended certain acts to be prosecuted under a particular statute and 
not another will the Court find an abuse of discretion. See State v. Barnes, 133 
Idaho 378, 381-82, 987 P.2d 290, 293-94 (1999) (finding that two statutes 
applied but no legislative intent to make crime of driving a snowmobile on a road 
under the influence an infraction rather than a misdemeanor). Anderson has 
failed to show an abuse of charging discretion because both the kidnapping and 
the child custody interference statutes legitimately apply to her conduct. 
Anderson argues that the doctrine of in pari materia prevents the 
kidnapping statute from applying to her case (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-25), 
applying the doctrine in two mutually inconsistent ways (compare Appellant's 
brief, pp. 19-20 (child custody interference statute "indicates a legislative intent to 
protect the rights of parents not included under Idaho's Kidnapping statute") with 
Appellant's brief,pp. 21-23 (child custody interference statute "is an 
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acknowledgment that a parent taking a child from another parent is 
fundamentally different than when a child is abducted by a complete stranger"). 
Application of the in pari materia doctrine does not show any legislative intent to 
remove prosecutorial charging discretion in relation to crimes that fall within both 
the kidnapping and the child custody interference statutes. 
The in pari materia doctrine was applied by the Idaho Supreme Court to 
find no abuse of prosecutorial discretion in Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290. 
Barnes was charged with misdemeanor driving under the influence for driving a 
snowmobile on the road while intoxicated. kL at 379-80, 987 P.2d at 291-92. 
Barnes argued that because there was an infraction statute specifically dealing 
with operating a snowmobile under the influence, she could only be charged with 
the infraction and not the misdemeanor. kL at 381-82, 987 P.2d at 293-94. The 
Court reasoned that although the snowmobile statute was more specific than the 
DUI statute in relation to the type of vehicle, the DUI statute was more specific in 
relation to operation on roads. kL at 382, 987 P.2d at 294. Because operating a 
snowmobile on a road legitimately fell within the purview of both statutes, the 
prosecutor had discretion to charge under either. kL at 382-84, 987 P .2d at 294-
96. 
The section of the kidnapping statute at issue this case applies to a 
"person who willfully .. , [I]eads, takes, entices away or detains a child under the 
age of sixteen (16) years, with intent to keep or conceal it from its custodial 
parent, guardian or other person having lawful care or control thereof." I.C. § 18-
4501 (2). The relevant portion of the child custody interference statute applies 
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when a "person ... intentionally and without lawful authority: Takes, entices 
away, keeps or withholds any minor child from a parent or another person or 
institution having custody, joint custody, visitation or other parental rights, 
whether such rights arise from temporary or permanent custody order, or from 
the equal custodial rights of each parent in the absence of a custody order .... " 
I.C. § 18-4506(1 )(a). Secondary differences include that the section of the 
kidnapping statute applies only to children under 16 while the child custody 
interference statute applies to all minors. The primary difference between these 
statutes, however, is that kidnapping requires specific "intent to keep or conceal" 
the child while it is enough under the child custody interference statute to merely 
"withhold[]" regardless of intent. Thus, a person who interferes with visitation or 
other custodial rights without intent to keep or conceal the child commits only 
child custody interference. 
Anderson is correct when she argues that the child custody interference 
statute "indicates a legislative intent to protect the rights of parents not included 
under Idaho's Kidnapping statute." (Appellant's brief, p. 19.) That the child 
custody interference is broader and less specific indicates that the legislature did 
not intend to exclude from the kidnapping statute all takings of children that 
interfere with custodial rights. Indeed, because the illegal taking of a child for any 
length of time will necessarily interfere with somebody's custodial rights, it only 
makes sense that the legislature intended both statutes to be fully applicable 
where the facts of the crime justify the charge. To hold that the child taking 
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portion of the kidnapping statute applies only where there is no child custody 
interference is to nUllify that portion of the kidnapping statute. 
In this regard the analysis of the Idaho Court of Appeals in Folsom, 139 
Idaho 627, 84 P.3d 563, is instructive. In that case Folsom argued that he should 
have been charged with neglect of a vulnerable adult instead of the far more 
serious charge of abandonment of a vulnerable adult because the charged acts 
necessarily involved neglect. The court of appeals "decline[d] to presume a 
redundancy between entire statutes," and therefore declined to "read the 
abandonment statute as but another expression of the exploitation, abuse and 
neglect statute." kl at 630, 84 P.3d at 566. Rather, the latter statute was "a 
consistent (if overlapping) expression of a legislative desire to shield vulnerable 
adults from all manner of mistreatment." kl "When in the event of such overlap 
an action could be charged under either statute, prosecutorial discretion will 
control the charging decision." kl 
Here there is clear overlap between the two statutes. All actions that 
constitute kidnapping of a child to conceal him or her from a custodial parent, 
guardian or other person with lawful care or control will necessarily interfere with 
child custody rights. Not all actions that interfere with child custody rights will, 
however, constitute kidnapping. Thus, there is clear legislative intent to provide 
overlapping protections against those who would take or entice a child away from 
someone with legal custody. Such overlap requires the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in making charging decisions. Anderson's argument that the 
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legislature intended no crimes that interfere with child custody rights be charged 
as kidnapping is without merit. 
Finally, the legislative history supports the conclusion that the legislature 
intended the kidnapping and child custody interference statutes to overlap and to 
work together. The testimony before the House Judiciary, Rules and 
Administration Committee indicates the child custody interference bill, H135, was 
to address '''gray area' in the existing statute" and assure that when a parent or 
other person did interfere with custody rights, federal agents (who could only act 
if the crime was a felony) could be enlisted to help find any child taken out of the 
state. (House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee Minutes (2/13/87) 
(attached as Appendix A).) The Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee Minutes 
include a legal memorandum by a Deputy Attorney General. (Senate Judiciary 
and Rules Committee Minutes (3/6187) (attached as Appendix B).) That 
memorandum noted the 1985 amendment to the kidnapping statute (to add the 
word "custodial") took the "important step" of making the kidnapping statute 
applicable to parents who take their own children in violation of custody orders. 
(Appendix B (Memorandum, p. 2).) The kidnapping statute, however, does not 
"fully address the problem of custodial interference." (Id.) Making child custody 
interference a felony would also bring more acts within the scope of the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, allowing federal officials to aid state officials 
in locating taken children. (Id.) 
The minutes of the hearings on the child custody interference bill thus 
suggest that the legislature was looking for a way to supplement the existing 
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kidnapping law as it applied to children, not supplant it. That the legislature 
wished to give the state, and parents, more options in protecting rights and 
tracking down taken children shows the legislature did not intend to limit 
prosecutorial charging discretion. 
The state could have charged Anderson with child custody interference. 
That it could have does not show that it abused its discretion by charging 
kidnapping. Because both statutes legitimately apply to Anderson's conduct, 
which crime to charge was a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 
Anderson has failed to show error in the district court's order refusing dismissal 
of this case.2 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
denying dismissal with prejudice. 
DATED this 30th day of December, 2011. 
2 The state further notes that dismissal with prejudice is not an appropriate 
remedy, because such may bar any subsequent prosecution (and would almost 
certainly foster additional litigation on this point). If the proper charge is child 
custody interference, the state would request an opportunity to amend or file new 
charges. 
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HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES & ADMINISTRATION COMMMITTEE 
MINUTES 
Friday, February 13, 1987, 1:30 p.m. 
See attached list. 
The meeting was called to order by Chairman Loveland at the appointed time. 
All members of the Committee were present with the exception of Representa-
tives Lloyd and Giovanelli. Mr. John Pino sat.in for Rep. McDermott and 
Rep. Lowder sat in for Rep. Bengson. 
Rep. Deckard moved for approval of the minutes of the February 11, 1987, 
meeting, seconded by Rep. Hartung. The motion carried. 
Mr. Richard Cade explained the changes which were made in some of the word-
ing and after a short discussion it was moved by Rep. Herndon, seconded by 
Rep. Deckard that RS13202C2 be introduced for printing. Upon being put to 
a vote the motion carried. 
Rep. Childers introduced this legislation which he indicated had been pre-
pared with considerable input from the Idaho Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
He also distributed copies of a memorandum which had been prepared by Pat Kole 
of the Attorney General's office. This memorandum provides detail of the 
"gray area " in the eXisting statute . Among other things, the proposed sta tute 
makes the offense of parental kidnapping a felony, making it possible for the 
state to enlist the assistance of federal investigative resources in tracking 
down parents who are in violation. 
After some disctBsiln it wa s moved by Rep . Herndon, seconded by Rep. Si mp s on, 
tha t H135 be sent to the floor with a "do pass" recommendation. The notion 
carried. 
After a short presentation by Rep. Montgomery and there being no questions from 
the Committee, it was moved by Rep. Montgomery, seconded by Rep. Hay, that H134 
be sent to the floor with a "do pass" recommendation. The motion carried. Rep . 
Montgomery will sponsor the bill. 
Rep. Hay advised the Committee that the main purpose of this legislation was 
to insure that doctors who make alcoholism evaluations are persons who qualify 
to make these evaluations . She went on to say that the Idaho Medical Association 
has no problem with this requirement, which is needed to strengthen the law. 
After some discussion it was moved by Rep. Simpson, seconded by Rep. Herndon, 
that H121 be sent to the floor with a "do pass " recommendation. The motion 
carried. Rep. Hay will sponsor. 
This item on the agenda was not addressed because Mr. Pat Kole, Attorney 
General's office, who was to present it to the Committee, had been detained 
and was not in attendance . 
There being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting 
was adjourned by Chairman Loveland at 2:55 p.m. 




SENATE JUDICIARY AND RULES COMMITTEE 
Friday 






Senators Fairchild, Darrington, Rydalch, Staker, 
Anderson, Bray, Reed, Wetherell, Brooks 
Senators Risch and McRoberts 
Rich Randall, Fire Fighter 
Robert Kiernan, Fire Marshall 
Lynn Nokes, Fire Fighter 
Alan Wolfe, Realtor 
Representat~ve Mary Hartung 
Representative Phil Childers 
Olivia Craven, Corrections Department 
Chairman Fairchild called the meeting to order at 1:45 P.M., in 
Room 426, and noted that a quorum was present. 
Moved by Senator Bray, second by Senator Reed, that the minutes 





To make it clear that city police and other 
police officers have the authority to go beyond 
their geographical jurisdictional boundaries 
while in fresh pursuit - Representative Hartung 
gave a brief presentation of the bill, noting 
full support of the cities and counties, and 
responded to questions from the floor. 
Moved by Senator Wetherell, second by Senator 
Darrington, that H 58 be sent to the floor with 
a DO PASS ~COMMENDATION. On a voice vote, the 
motion passed. 
NAY: Senator Staker 
ABSENT: Senators R~sch and McRoberts 
SPONSOR: Senator Wetherell 
To provide a definition of child custody and 
visitation and to provide penalties for 
violation - Representative Childers gave a 
brief presentation and introduced Mr. Allen 
Wolfe for a personal case history to show how 
the bill would be helpful. He then responded 
to questions. 
Minutes 
Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee 
March 6, 198} 
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MOTION Moved by Senator Bray, second by Senator 
Rydalch, that H 135 be sent to the floor 
with a DO PASS R~COMMENDATION. On a voice 
vote, the motion passed. 
Absent: Senators Risch and McRoberts 
Sponsor: Senator Fairchild 
S 1176 This legislation provides for civil action 
for malicious harassment. Senator Reed 
briefly reiterated the merits of the bill 
and opened her presentation for discussion. 
MOTION Moved by Senator Reed, second by Senator 
Bray, that S 1176 be sent to the floor with 
a DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. On a voice vote, 
the motion passed. 
S 1162 
Absent: Senators Risch and McRoberts 
Sponsor: Senator Reed 
Chairman Fairchild inv~ted Pat Kole of the 
Attorney General~ office to present the bill, 
section by section, to the committee. Mr. 
Kole then responded to questions. 
Chairman Fairchild excused himself form committee at the end 
of Mr. Koles presentation. Vice Chairman Darrington assumed 
controle of the meeting and with the instruction of Chairman 
Fairchild, invited Olivia Craven of the Corrections Department 
to address the committee regarding S 1162. 
MOTION 
RS 20316C2 
Moved by Senator Staker, second by Senator 
Bray, that S 1162 be HELD IN COMMITTEE 
On a roll call vote, the motion passed. 
AYE: Senators Staker, Bray, Wetherell and 
Brooks 
NAY: Senators Darr~ngton, Rydalch and 
Anderson 
ABSENT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed and 
Fairchild 
To provide a new section in Idaho Code, 
Chapter ~, Title 18, titled Aggravated 
Arson -Senator Bray made a brief presentation 
and responded to quest~ons. 
Minutes 
senate Judiciary 









and Rules Committee 
Moved by Senator Anderson, second by 
Senator Brooks, that RS ~0316C~ be lntro-
duced for printing. No vote taken. 
Moved by Senator Staker, second by 
Senator Wetherell, that RS 20J16e2 be 
introduced for printing and sent to the 
floor with a DO PASS RLCOMMENDATION at the 
same time. On a roll call vote, the motion 
passed. 
AYE: Senators Staker, Bray, Wetherell, and 
Brooks 
NAY: Senators Darrington, Rydalch and 
Anderson 
ABSENT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed, 
and Fairchild 
SPONSOR: Senator Bray 
Providing offset printing of House and 
Senate bills, resolutions, memorials and 
amendments, and flxing the price for same. 
Senator Darrington made a brief presentation. 
Moved by Senator Anderson, second by Senator 
Brooks, that HeR 3 be sent to the floor with 
a DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. On a voice vote, 
the motion passed. 
ABSENT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed, and 
Fairchild 
SPONSOR: Senator Falrchild 
Providing for printing the session laws, 
fixing the price for printing same, and the 
price the public shall be charged for copies. 
Senator Darrlngton made a brief presentation. 
Moved by senator Anderson, second by senator 
Bray, that HCR 16 be sent to the floor with 
a DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. On a voice vote, 
the motion passed. 
ABSLNT: Senators Risch, McRoberts, Reed, and 
Fairchild 
SPONSOR: Senator Fairchild 
There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Minutes 
Senate Judiciary and Rules Committee 
March 6, 1987 
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CHILD CUSTODY INTERFERENCE STATUTE / H [) I) 5 
TELEPHONE 
12081334 - 2400 
In response to a request for the drafting of a child custody 
interference statute, this memorandum discusses the current Idaho 
kidnapping statute, which was amended in 1985 to cover certain 
parental kidnapping situations, and proposes two chi ld custody 
interference statutes, both of which expressly apply to a wider 
variety of custodial interference si tuations than those covered 
under the kidnapping statute. These versions are based upon 
suggestions in law review articles and comparable laws from other 
states. 
I. The Current Idaho Kidnapping Statute, Idaho Code § 18-4501 
In 1985, Idaho Code § 18-4501 was amended by adding the word 
"custodial" to subsection 2. Now kidnapping under that subsection 
is defined as: 
Every person who willingly: (2) leads, 
takes, entices away or detains a child under 
the age of sixteen (16) years, with intent 
to keep or conceal it from its custodial 
parent, guardian or other person having 
lawful care or control thereof ... 
The offense is deemed second degree kidnapping if no ransom 
is demanded, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison from 
C'ne to twenty-five years. Idaho Code § 18-4503. Thus, a parent 
~dy now be convicted of a felony offense for snatching his or her 
chiJd from the parent or other person having lawful custody. 
- 1 -
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The statute was applied to convict a father of second-degree 
kidnapping in State v. Chapman, 108 Idaho 841, 702 P.2d 879 (ct. 
App. 1985), where the court held that temporary custody orders, as 
well as permanent orders, were sufficient to give one parent 
"lawful custody" of the child which the other parent may not 
violate. 
The kidnapping statute may be viewed as the least restrictive 
means of dealing wi th custodial interference situations. This 
statute does make one important step. By making the offense of 
parental kidnapping a felony, the state may now enlist federal 
investigative resources in tracking down parents who have violated 
the statute and have taken the child to another state. The 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA) expressly 
directs the F.B.I. to aid states in which parental kidnapping is a 
felony in locating and apprehending the absconding parent in 
another state. Making the crime a felony al so aids the state in 
ob~aining extradition of the parent from a sis e. 
· / Although the statute makes this important step, and applies 
I even to protect temporary custody orders, it does not full 
\, address the problem of cust· . e fe ence a 
i.. ~y-n'fEerferen€Statut~ s necessa~~O~d~O.L--"'S~o~.,-. __ - __ --------
II. Factors to Consider in Drafting a Child Custody 
Interference Statute 
A. Existence of a court order 
While most state criminal custodial interference laws require 
violation of a court order as an element of the offense, it has 
been noted that many instances of parental kidnapping occur before 
any court order has been entered. More restrictive statutes, such 
as the Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes, have provisions which do 
not require the existence of a court order, and specifically apply 
to situations where a court action has been filed bringing child 
custody into issue, but before any custody decree has been entered. 
An Arizona case applied its state's custodial interference 
statute to convict a woman who had aided a father in kidnapping 
his child and taking the child to another state, even though no 
custody order existed. The court in State v. Donahue, 680 P.2d 
191 (Ariz. App. 1984) held that in absence of a court order, the 
father had at most a "coequal" right to custody, which he could 
not exercise to exclude the mother . The Arizona statute on which 
the conviction was based provides: 
A person commits custodial interference if, 
knowing or having reason to know that he has 
no legal right to do so, such person 
knowingly takes, entices or keeps from 
lawful custody any child less than eighteen 




authori ty of law to the custody of another 
person or institution. (A.R.S. 13-1302A) 
Because the Arizona statute does not expressly require a 
violation of a court order, but more generally speaks to "lawful 
custody" by "authority of law," such a court interpretation is 
possible. 
Idaho's legislature has also recogni2".ed parents' "coequal" 
right of custody in their children. Idaho Code § 32-1007 states 
that: "The father and mother of a legitimate unmarried minor 
child are equally entitled to its custody, services, and 
earnings. " Thus, a court in Idaho could construe a statute 
similar to Arizona's statute as applying even in absence of a 
court order. But rather than creating a statute with vague terms 
such as "lawful authority" which leaves the law open for varying 
court interpretations, it might be better to expressly describe 
situations to which the statute should apply, such as the 
Minnesota and Wisconsin statutes which apply once a court action 
has been filed. 
-~===----------------
B. Violations by the Custodial Parent 
One area which Idaho's current kidnapping law does not 
address is action by a custodial parent which might interfere with 
the other parent's visitation or joint custody rights. By 
addressing the possible misconduct of a parent having legal 
custody, that parent is deterred from misusing his or her 
.. custodial" status I the rights of both parents are more fully / 
s cured, and disruption of a court ordered custody arrangement 
be omes less likely. 
Child Out 0 tate 
Many state statutes treat intrastate child snatching as a 
misdemeanor and interstate chi ld snatching as a felony _ States 
are often reluctant to consider parental kidnapping a serious 
crime because a parent's motives in snatching a child are often 
based on the parent's honest belief that he or she is acting for 
the welfare of the child. Likewise, prosecutors often resist such 
laws because they do not d their limited resources by 
handling what t to be domestlc " es. Despi te 
th object" s, it is necessary to consider the offense y 
obtain federal lster state ln 
has and 
usse 
The resulting intrastate/interstate dichotomy can be seen as 
.-..9- sensibJ..e... compromise4 and one that might be necessary to obtain 
passage of such a law. I f a kidnapping parent keeps a chi ld 
wi thin the state borders, the danger of that parent permanently 
keeping the child from the other parent is much less, and a court 






an incentive for a parent determined to snatch his or her child to 
rernai n in the s ta te to ~ay;s.u'(~-£-E~*l:y--€H'l:a-~~h---___ _ 
A _ID restrictive statute, however, would rec nize 
ustodial interference as a serious crime even if the child as 
been kept in the state. The primary evi 1 s to be prevented by a 
custodial interference law are disruptions of family livin 
arrangements, the harmful effect such disruptions have on a child, 
and the denial of the relative rights that each parent may have 
regarding their children. The fact that an absconding parent 
in the state with the child does Ii ttle to mitigate the \ 
~~~~~~~~~·s~r~u~ptions. /) 
D. Agents of Parents 
A custodial interference statute should also expressly apply 
to those persons acting as agents of a parent. Those who help a 
parent by taking the child or by intentionally withholding 
information from the lawful custodian regarding the location of 
the child may then be held accountable for their actions as well. 
E. Expenses Incurred in Locating Child 
A few statutes allow for the recovery of expenses incurred by 
the lawful custodian in locating and regaining custody of a child 
taken in violation of the statute. Such provisions are usually 
enforced at the discretion of the judge or jury. Oregon, for 
example, provides that such expenses are "pecuniary damages for 
purposes of restitution." See O.R.S. § 163.245. But Washington, 
in comparison, provides that "any reasonable expenses incurred 
shall be assessed against the defendant." R.C.W. 9A.40.080. 
F. Defenses and Mitigating Factors; Other Provisions 
Following is a list of factors which states often consider as 
providing a defense or mitigation to the crime of custodial 
interference. Depending on the particular statute, such factors 
may constitute a complete defense to the crime, lessen the 
penalty, or reduce a felony to a misdemeanor: 
1. Child's return before arrest of parent (may set time 
limit) 
2. Child's return within a specified time after the 
expiration of an authorized visitation privilege (12, 24 
hrs., etc.) 
3. Teenage child leaves lawful custodian without consent. 
4. Chi ld taken to protect the chi Id from imminent physical 
harm (e.g., sexual abuse) 
- 4 -
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5. Chi ld taken by a parent fleeing from imminent physical 
harm to himself or herself 
6. Consent by lawful custodian 
7. Authorized by law 
8. Actor in good fai th gave notice 
juvenile authorities within a 
taking child 
Other notable provisions include: 
to law enforcement or 
reasonable time after 
9. Detaining child outside the state for 72 hours is prima 
facia evidence that person charged intended to violate 
order at time of taking 
10. Subjecting the child to physical harm raises the offense 
to a felony 
III. Draft Statutes 
Based on the effect of Idaho's current kidnapping statute and 
the consideration of the various factors listed above, this 
memorandum proposes two versions of a chi ld custody interference 
law for Idaho. 
A. Most Restrictive Version 
This version expressly states types of custodial rights 
protected. It applies not only to custody rights, but to joint 
custody and visitation rights as well. This statute also applies 
whether or not a custody decree has been entered, and applies to 
the situation where a court action has been filed but a custody 
order has not been issued. 
The defenses listed allow a person to take the child from a 
lawful custodian if the child or that person is in imminent danger 
of physical harm, and allow a 24-hour leeway for returning the 
child after visitation privileges have expired. 
The only penalty reduction occurs if the person taking the 
child did not leave the state with the child, and returned the 
child unharmed. Thus, an intrastate offense is still a felony if 
the person taking the child is arrested before he returns the 
child. If intrastate custody interference is considered a felony 
until the child is returned, the apprehension of the person taking 
the child will be given a higher priority by state law enforcement. 
Reasonable costs incurred in locating the chi ld are mandatori ly 
assessed against the defendant. 
Child Custogy Interference Definedj Defensesj Punishment 
- 5 -
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1. Any person, whether a parent or other, 
or agent of that person, who 
intentionally and without lawful 
authority: 
(a) takes, entices away I keeps or 
wi thho Ids any minor chi Id from a 
parent or other person or 
insti tution having custody, joint 
custody, visitation or other 
parental rights, whether such 
rights arise from temporary or 
permanent custody order, or from 
the equal custodial rights of each 
parent in the absence of a custody 
order, or; 
(b) takes I entices away, keeps or 
withholds a minor child from a 
parent after commencement of an 
action relating to child 
visitation or custody but prior to 
the issuance of an order 
determining custody or visitation 
rights; is guilty of child custody 
interference. 
2. It shall be an affirmative defense to a 
violation of subsection (1) that: 
(a) the action is taken to protect 










is taken by a 
from imminent 
to himself or 
(c) the action is consented to by 
the lawful custodian; 
(d) the child is returned within 
24 hours after expiration of an 
authorized visitation privilege. 
3. A violation of SUbsection (1) shall be 
a felony, unless the defendant did not 
take the child outside the state, and 
the child was voluntarily returned 
unharmed prior to the defendant's 
arrest, in which case the violation 




4. Any reasonable expenses incurred by a 
lawful custodian in locating or 
attempting to locate a child taken in 
violation of sUbsection (1 ) shall be 
assessed against the defendant. 
B. Less Restrictive Version 
This version defines custodial interference in much the same 
fashion as the Arizona statute. Much simpler than the more 
restrictive version, it does not expressly describe or list the 
types of custodial rights protected. Rights to visitation, for 
example, are not expressly protected under this statute. 
The interstate-felony/intrastate-misdemeanor distinction is 
provided in this statute, and more defenses are expressly 
a~lowed. Imposing costs on the defendant is left to the court's 
di scretion. 
Child Custody Interference Defined; Defenses; Penalties 
1. A person or agent of that person 
commits custodial interference if, 
knowing or having reason to know that 
he or she has no legal right to do so, 
such person knowingly takes, entices or 
keeps from lawful custody any minor 
child entrusted by authority of law to 
the custody of another person or 
institution. 
2. It is an affirmative defense that: 
wi thin 30 
custodial 
defendant 
(a) prior to arrest and 





(b) the action is taken to protect 









is taken by a 
from imminent 
to himself or 
(d) the lawful custodian consented 
to the action; 
- 7 -
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( e) the chi ld is returned wi thi n 
24 hours of the expiration of a 
visitation privilegej 
(f) the child, being at the time 
more than fourteen years old, was 
taken away at his or her own 
instigation, without enticement. 
3. A violation of sUbsection (1) shall be 
a misdemeanor, unless the defendant 
takes the child outside the state's 
borders, in which case the violation is 
a felony. 
4. Reasonable expenses incurred by a 
lawful custodian in locating or 
attempting to locate a child taken in 
violation of subsection ( 1 ) may be 




M E M 0 RAN DUM 
ro: PAT KOLE 
FROM: TIM KELLY 
DATE: February 20, 1987 
RE: SURVEY OF CUSTODIAL INTERFERENCE LAWS 
Enclosed in Appendix A, you will find a synopsis of state 
laws, except Idaho's, concerning custodial interference, or a 
simi lar crime. In response to your direct query, how many states 
puni sh custodial interference or a simi lar crime as a felony, 
whether interstate or intrastate, there are (21). This amounts to 
about 42% of the states. Therefore, the scheme of felony 
punishment for both degrees of custodial interferences constitutes 
a plurality. 






TABLE OF CRIMINAL STATUTES; PROVISIONS AS OF FEBRUARY. 1987 
ALA. CODE, TITLE 13A, SECTION 6-45 
Custodial interference is a felony, but if the actor is trying 
to regain lawful custody, there is no offense committed. 
ALASKA STAT. SECTIONS 11.41.320, 11.41.330 
Custodial interference in first degree, intrastate disposition, 
is a felony; otherwise it is a misdemeanor. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. SECTION 13-1302 
Custodial interference is a felony unless the child is returned 
unharmed prior to actor's arrest, in which case it is a 
misdemeanor. Arizona also provides that a perpetrator besides a 
parent committing the offense is guilty of a felony. 
ARK. STAT. ANN. SECTIONS 41-2415, 41-2416 
Interference with custody is a felony if the child is taken out 
of the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor. Notwithstanding, 
for these provi sions to be pliable, a contempt citation must 
have been ignored for (90) days. 
CAL. PENAl, CODE, SECTIONS 278, 278.5 
Child abduction by a person having no right is a felony. Any 
violation of a custody decree is a felony. 
COLO. REV. STAT. SECTIONS 18-3-304 
Violation of custody is a felony. 
affirmative defense. 
Child in danger is an 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. SECTIONS 53a-97, 53a-98 
Interstate custodial interference is a misdemeanor, while 
intrastate custodial interference is a felony. 
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DEL. CODE TITLE 11, SECTION 785 
Interference wi th custody is a misdemeanor, unless child is 
removed from the state. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. SECTIONS 787.03, 787.04 
Custodial interference within the state is a misdemeanor, while 
custodial interference in violation of a court order, or taking 
the child out of state is a felony. 
GA. CODE ANN. SECTION 16-5-45 
Interference with custody is a felony if the child is removed 
from the state, and likewise if the child is not removed from 
the state. 
IlAWAII REV. STAT. SECTIONS 707-726, 707-727 
Custodial interference is a felony if the child is removed from 
the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor. However, violation of 
a court order pertaining to custody is a felony. 
ILL. ANN. STATE. CHAPTER 38, SECTION 10-5 
Custodial interference of any degree is a felony. It is no 
10nger an affirmative defense if the child is returned wi thin 
(72) hours after removal. 
IND. CODE ANN. SECTION 35-42-3-B 
Like Illinois, custodial interference of any degree is a felony. 
IOWA CODE ANN. SECTION 710.6 
Violating a custody order by concealing a child out of the 
state, or in the state, is a felony. 
RAN. STAT. SECTION 21-3422 
Custodial interference, aggravated or not, is a felony. 
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KY. REV. STAT. SECTION 509.070 
custodial interference by a parent is a felony. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. SECTION 14.45.1 
Custodial interference is a misdemeanor, unless the chi ld is 
removed from the state, upon which it is a felony. Costs of 
returning child to proper jurisdiction can be assessed against 
defendant. 
ME. REV. STAT. TITLE 17-A, SECTION 303 
Criminal restraint by a parent is a felony. 
MD. ANN. CODE. FAMILY LAW, SECTIONS 9-301-9-304 
Custodial interference is a misdemeanor, unless the child is 
removed from the state. An interesting affirmative defense is 
provided for. If the child is in danger, and the abductor 
submits to jurisdiction of a court within (96) hours to modify 
custody, then custodial interference has not been committed. 
MASS. GEN LAWS. ANN. CHAPTER 265 SECTION 26A 
Kidnapping by a relative in violation of a custody order is a 
mi sdemeanor unless the chi ld is taken out of state or put in 
danger, in which case it is a felony. 
MICH. STAT. ANN. SECTION 750.178 
Concealment from a proper guardian or parent is a felony. 
MINN. STAT. ANN. SECTION 609.26 
Violation f a custody order is a felony. The court may assess 
costs incurred by lawful custodian in obtaining custody. 
MISS. CODE ANN. SECTION 97-3-51 
Interstate removal of a child by a non-custodial parent or 
relative is a felony, as is intrastate removal. 
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MO. ANN. STAT. SECTION 565.150 
Interference with custody is a misdemeanor unless the child is 
removed from state in which case it is a felony. 
MO~. REV. CODES ANN. SECTION 45-5-304 
Custodial interference is a felony. 
NEB. REV. STATE. SECTION 28-316 
Vio1ation of the natural custody rights of the legal custodian 
is a misdemeanor, but violation of the court's decree is a 
felony. 
NEV. REV. STAT. SECTION 200.359 
Vio1ation of a court's custody decree is a misdemeanor. 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. SECTION 633:4 
Interference with custody is a felony if the child is taken out 
of the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor. Affirmative 
defenses are nullified if the child is taken out of state. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. SECTION 2C: 13-4 
Interference with custody by a parent or third party is a felony. 
N.M. STAT. ANN. SECTION 30-4-4 
Custodial interference by removal of a child from the state is a 
felony. 
N.Y. [PENAL] SECTIONS 135.45, 135.50 
Custodial interference is a felony if the child is in danger or 
taken from the state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor . 
• 
N.C. GEN. STAT. SECTION 14-320.1 
It is a felony to transport a child out of state in violation of 
a custody order. 
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N.D. CENT. CODE SECTION 14-14-22.1 
It is a felony to transport a child out of state in violation of 
a custody order. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. SECTIONS 2905.04, 2919.23 
I 
Child stealing by a parent is a felony, if the child is removed 
from the state, otherwise it is a misdemeanor. Interference 
with a custody decree is a misdemeanor. 
OKLA. STATE. ANN . TITLE 21, SECTION 891 
Child stealing is a felony. 
OR. REV. STAT. SECTIONS 163.245, 163 . 257 
Both degrees of custodial interference are felonies. 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. SECTION 2904 
Interference with custody by a parent or third party is a felony 
if child is taken out of state; otherwise it is a misdemeanor. 
R . I. GEN. LAWS, SECTION 11-26- 1.1 
Child snatching is a felony. 
S . C. CODE SECTION 16-17-495 
Violation of a custody order by transporting a child out of 
state is a felony. 
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. SECTIONS 22-19- 9, 22-19-10 
Interference with 
conviction thereof 
also a felony. 
custody is a 
is a felony. 
misdemeanor, but upon second 
Removing child from state is 
TENN. CODE ANN. SECTIONS 39-2-301, 39-2-303 
Concealment of a child is a felony, while actually kidnapping of 
one's own child is not considered a felony. 
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~. [PENAL] CODE ANN. TITLE 6, SECTION 25.03 
Interference with custody is a felony if the child is removed 
from the state. 
urrAH CODE ANN. SECTION 76-5-303 
Interference with custody, including visitation rights by either 
a parent or a third party is a misdemeanor, but if the child is 
removed from the state is a felony. 
VT. STAT. ANN. TITLE 13, SECTION 2451 
Custodial interferences resulting in either interstate 
dispositions or intrastate dispositions are felonies. 
VA. CODE SECTION 18.2-47 
Custodial interference is a misdemeanor. 
WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. SECTIONS 9A.40.060" 9A.40.070 
Custodial interference if the child is not removed from the 
state is a misdemeanor, otherwise it is a felony. However, a 
second conviction for instate custodial interference is a felony. 
W.VA. CODE SECTION 61-2-14d 
Concealment or removal of a minor child from custodian is a 
felony: interstate or intrastate. 
WIS. STAT. ANN. SECTION 946.71 
Interference with custody is a felony if the chi ld is removed 
from the state, or held over (12) hours in state. 
WYO. STAT. SECTION 6-2-204 
Interference with custody is a felony. 
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